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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction: 
A sensor is a type of transducer. Most sensors are electrical or electronic, 
although other types exist. Sensors exist is various types which include thermal, 
mechanical, chemical, electromagnetic, optical radiation, ionization radiation and 
acoustic. Sensors are used in everyday life. When these sensors are connected with each 
other through a wireless protocol, they constitute a Wireless Sensor Network (WSN).  
A WSN is a wireless network consisting of spatially distributed autonomous devices 
using sensors to cooperatively monitor physical or environmental conditions, such as 
temperature, sound, vibration, pressure, motion or pollutants, at different locations. The 
development of wireless sensor networks was originally motivated by military 
applications such as battlefield surveillance. However, wireless sensor networks are now 
used in many civilian application areas, including environment and habitat monitoring, 
healthcare applications, home automation, and traffic control. It is crucial that the 
security of sensor networks be monitored and diagnosed to ensure correct behavior. 
1.2 Problems in existing models: 
Due to resource scarcity of sensors, protecting sensor networks is a more difficult 
problem than protecting conventional networks using traditional schemes. Sensor 
networks have limited resources in terms of power and memory which is constraint on 
the computational capabilities of the nodes. Conventional security models focus mainly 
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on key management based techniques. A typical traditional public-private key scheme 
involves management and safe keeping of a small number of private and public keys. 
Although a lot of work has been done in protecting sensor networks, most of this work 
has focused on providing effective key-management techniques for authentication or 
secure routing of messages. Such techniques cause huge communication and computing 
overhead [3], [5], [6]. In certain models [4] the nodes collect the data and decide on their 
own. This adds too much complexity to each node which is typically constrained in terms 
of resources. Not much work has been done on responding to an attacker\attack based on 
the objective of the network. In this thesis, we look at a security model that focuses on 
using game theory and risk assessment to improve the security of the network. 
1.3 Proposed Work: 
 The model shown in this thesis uses game theory concepts and risk estimation to 
secure the wireless sensor network. In a cluster based wireless sensor network we look at 
a game theoretic model where the payoff is used to identify the response of the network 
to an attack. 
 The game is played between the attacker and the network. The nodes collect 
utility parameters which tell us the life time, integrity and throughput of the nodes. Each 
node’s payoff is a function of the above said parameters. We develop a risk assessment 
model that quantifies the overall threat to the network and the every node’s estimated risk 
of exposure. Factors such as vulnerabilities and perceived damage of attack are 
considered for estimating the damage and we use fuzzy logic to determine the threat. 
Accurate risk estimation helps to choose an appropriate response that will maximize the 
payoff by minimizing the risk. The risk assessment is integrated into the game. We use 
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the basic game framework given in [4] for parameter and payoff formulations. We extend 
the framework with risk assessment and analyze the strategies and the game equilibrium. 
When an attack is identified, the payoff is calculated and the network looks at the various 
possible responses to the attack. Based on the objective of the network, the payoff is 
defined, and therefore the strategy that gives the maximum payoff is chosen by the 
network. Although some work has been done on using game theory for securing sensor 
networks, using risk assessment and game theory is a relatively unexplored area. 
1.4 Document Outline: 
The rest of the document is organized as follows. Chapter II summarizes related 
literature review on security protocols and risk assessment for sensor networks. Chapter 
III presents the security model including the parameter definitions, payoff function, game 
formulation and risk assessment model in a detailed manner. Chapter IV discusses the 
test study of the risk model explained and the game equilibrium Chapter V is conclusion 
of the work.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
2.1 Literature Review 
 The limited resource of sensor nodes makes it undesirable to use public-key 
algorithms, such as Diffie-Hellman key agreement [8]. A sensor node may need tens of 
seconds or even minutes to perform these operations. As sensor nodes are usually 
deployed in large numbers, it is desired that each sensor be low cost. Consequently, it is 
hard to make them tamper-resistant [5] [4]. 
Different security protocols are available for sensor networks. The SNEP Protocol [5] has 
low communication overhead, providing baseline security primitives like data 
confidentiality, two-party data authentication, reply protection and message freshness. 
The TESLA protocol [9] uses a symmetric key mechanism. A wide range of attack 
detection mechanisms have been developed [17] and developing the guidelines to assess 
risk in organizations [18] and financial markets [19]. In wireless sensor networks it is 
hard to estimate risk accurately because of the complexity of factors involved. To 
generate one-way key chain, the sender chooses the last key randomly and generates the 
remaining values by successively applying one way function. The protocol discloses the 
key once per time interval and restricts the number of authenticated senders. To 
bootstrap, each receiver needs one authentication key of one-way function key chain. In 
[4] a key pre-distribution scheme is proposed that relies on probabilistic key sharing 
among nodes within the sensor network. The LEAP protocol [1] is based on the 
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observation that no single security requirement accurately suites all types of 
communication in a wireless sensor network. Therefore four different keys are used 
depending on whom the sensor node is communicating with, for example one key for 
group communication etc. Chan and Perrig [10] describe a mechanism for establishing a 
key between two sensor nodes that is based on the common trust of a third node 
somewhere within the sensor network. A wide range of attack detection mechanisms 
have been developed [17] and developing the guidelines to assess risk in organizations 
[18] and financial markets [19]. Risk estimation can be done by identifying the possibility 
of attacks and extent of damage that can be caused by the attack. Attack trees provide a 
formal way of describing the security of the systems, based on the varying attacks. In a 
typical attack tree, the root node is the ultimate goal of the attacker and the leaf nodes are 
the different possible ways of achieving the goal [20].  A number of approaches have 
been identified to defend against attacks. For example, Wood and Stankovic [11] defend 
against attacks by identifying the compromised part of the network effectively routing 
around the unavailable portion. Agah, Das, and Basu [4] propose a model in which the 
sensors collect utility parameters and define a payoff function based on the distance 
between the nodes. They define a game theory based model to form clusters and use the 
payoff functions to change the cluster setup dynamically. Here a lot of computation is 
done by the nodes and given the scarcity if resources it raises practicability issues. To the 
best of our knowledge no reported work uses risk assessment using damage and threat 
integration through fuzzy logic and cluster level game theory based decision making 
system for WSN security. 
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CHAPTER III 
THESIS WORK 
3.1 Problem Definition: 
 The distributed nature and resource constraints involved in sensor 
networks make them prone to a wide range of attacks. Although considerable amount of 
work has been done on sensor security, the focus has mainly been on providing an 
effective key management technique [7]. Disclosing a key with each packet requires too 
much energy [5]. Considerable memory and computation is used in storing one-way 
chain of secret keys along message routes [6]. The key management using a third party 
requires an engineered solution that makes it unsuitable for sensor network applications 
[2]. In asymmetric key cryptography, there is no trusted server, but key revocation 
becomes a bottleneck [3]. 
Using game theory in sensor network security is not a well explored area. One 
notable contribution in this section is by [4], in which they propose a model that uses 
utility parameters such as reputation and quality of security (network’s trustworthiness). 
The primary objective of the model in [4] is to method to create dynamic clusters in WSN 
using game theory. However, in this model the decision making unit is distributed and 
each node is responsible for collecting the utility parameters and computing payoff 
function. This involves much communication in the part of the nodes and the typical 
resource constraints associated with sensor network causes certain practicability issues. 
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3.2 Proposed Solution: 
 A game theory based model is shown here which uses quantified risk assessment 
and a game theoretic decision making system. This security model is designed as a non-
cooperative game between the attacker and the network. 
The model uses utility parameters to collect information and then using game 
theory concepts use a cost-payoff relation and risk assessment to efficiently secure the 
wireless sensor network. Under normal conditions the sensor nodes continue to perform 
their functions as required. Additionally they also collect statistical information which is 
defined by the base station as utility parameters. These utility parameters indicate the 
behavioral pattern of the nodes with respect to the neighboring nodes. When a threat is 
detected by the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) the nodes calculate their own payoff 
value using the utility parameters available to them at the given time. The payoff value of 
each node is then sent to the cluster head. The cluster head calculates the payoff function 
of the cluster and is sent to the base station. The Risk Assessment Engine (RAE) in the 
base station calculates a quantitative estimate of exposure of the network and amount of 
threat faced by the individual nodes. Using the risk estimate the Game Theory Based 
Decision Making System (GBDMS) chooses an appropriate response from the strategy 
set. The Decision Implementation System (DIS) is responsible for implementing the 
response chosen by the GBDMS at the node level. We assume that the DIS has 
information about the cost incurred in implementing each of the available strategy and 
that the cost value is available for the GBDMS during decision making process. Based on 
the Current Payoff, Risk estimate and cost of a given strategy, the GBDMS chooses an 
appropriate response that maximizes the payoff gain. 
3.2.1 System Architecture: 
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 Consider a cluster-based wireless sensor network. The network has a base station 
which is connected to the cluster head which in turn are connected to the end nodes.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure-3.1: Wireless Sensor Security Model Architecture 
Subsystems: 
RAE: Risk Assessment Engine 
IDS: Intrusion Detection System 
GBDMS: Game Theory Based Decision Making System 
1. PD : Payoff Definition 
2. UPD: Utility Parameter Definitions 
DIS: Decision Implementation System  
   RAE 
Other Inputs 
         IDS 
   DIS 
      GBDMS 
PD UPD 
SENSOR LEVEL 
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The cluster heads have more capacity (in terms of memory and power etc) than the end 
nodes and the base station is more capable than the cluster head. The base station is a 
central unit responsible for decision making and management of the network. We assume 
that an Intrusion detection system is available which identifies any inconsistency in the 
network which can be a threat to the network. We also assume that there is a Decision 
implementation system which handles implementing the decision made by the base 
station. We assume that the DIS has data pertaining to the cost involved in implementing 
a given strategy and is available for the base station. The RAE provides an estimation of 
the risk over the nodes. This assessment is a combination of potential threat and damage 
that can be cause on the network. The UPD contains the list of all parameters that the 
sensors can collect and the definition of the parameters. Based on the objective of the 
network, the UPD defines the set of parameters that will be collected by the nodes. The 
PD defines the payoff as a relation of utility parameters. When the response is to be 
chosen by the network it will be based on the risk estimation, payoff and cost of the 
strategy. 
3.2.2 Risk Assessment Model: 
 The risk assessment model primarily focuses on estimating the amount of damage 
a given threat can cause to the network and to the individual nodes. Since nodes have 
limited resources, a relatively accurate estimate of possible damage to the network and 
the nodes can be used by the base station to choose the strategy better. The base station 
can implement the appropriate security strategy such that the strategy utilizes the 
resources efficiently and secures the network as well. 
The factors that we consider for estimating the risk are Vulnerability (V), Damage (D), 
Threat (T) and Attack tree (A). 
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(i) Vulnerability (V):  
These are the various security gaps present in the communication protocol 
that can be exploited by an attacker. Depending on the type, structure and 
sophistication of the protocol a number of possible holes can be identified 
which can be used by a potential intruder in order to gain access to 
information. 
(ii) Damage (D): 
This is a degree of harm that an attacker can cause on the network if a 
certain level of security is breached. Depending on the amount of access 
gained by the attacker and the significance of the resources or data 
accessed, the damage can be high or low. This damage can be numerically 
represented and is known beforehand as it is defined by the user. 
(iii)Attack Tree (A): 
Attack trees provide a formal methodology for analyzing the security of 
systems and subsystems. An attack tree can be used to ascertain the degree 
to which an attack can proceed. The nodes in the attack tree are goal/sub-
goals that an attacker intends to accomplish. The edges represent the 
action which results when vulnerabilities in the system is exploited by an 
attacker. This results in a progress in the tree from one level to next level. 
Each node is associated with a damage value which is a degree of harm 
that an intruder at this level of the attack tree can inflict on the network.  
(iv) Threat (T): 
This is a numerical estimation of the risk that an attacker poses on to the 
network. This is not easy to obtain as the actions and intentions of the 
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attacker cannot be determined for certain. We use Fuzzy logic and fuzzy 
set to quantify the probabilistic risk that an intruder can cause to the 
network. 
3.2.2.1 Risk Estimation: 
 While estimating the risk we must consider the realistic threat imposed by the 
attacker on the network and the amount of damage that can be caused given the access 
gained by the intruder.  
Let the Threat be T and Damage be D. Then risk estimate can be given as RA = T * D 
3.2.2.1a. Calculating Damage (D): 
Damage can be seen as the degree of access gained by the intruder in terms 
of data, software etc. In calculating the damage, the first step is to identify the 
vulnerabilities in the network. The common wireless protocol used in the sensor 
networks is the IEEE 802.11. The protocol uses RC4 cipher whose inherent 
drawbacks can result in number of active and passive attacks using 
eavesdropping and tampering of wireless transmission etc. [13]. Once the 
vulnerabilities are identified, possible attack scenarios can be identified. Next, an 
Attack tree is constructed using the vulnerabilities and the resulting attack 
scenarios. For example, if the protocol allows eavesdropping then, it is possible 
for an intruder to obtain node ids and private key information.  
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Using this information the attacker can gain access to other resources such 
as application data. The attack tree is constructed with nodes, edges and levels. 
Each node is an attack tree state, which can be reached by performing an action 
which may or may not require a combination of lower level states. Figure 3.2 
represents an attack tree. Each node has an associated damage value which 
represents the degree of harm that can be caused on the network by the intruder 
in that attack tree state. The damage value increases as the level of the 
associated node increases. 
The attack tree can be represented in a matrix form with damage values. The 
matrix values is the damage value associated with the node at level i.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Attack Tree 
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3.2.2.1b. Calculating Threat (T): 
Threat is the potential harm an attacker can cause on the network. It is hard 
to estimate threat since it is hard to predict the attacker’s intentions and actions. 
We consider distance and attacker’s movement with respect to the node being 
considered to be parameters that can be used for threat estimation. If the 
attacker is close and /or the attacker is moving closer (both values exceed a 
certain threshold) then we can determine the threat using classical predicate 
logic. But the relationship between distance and movement has gray areas in 
which it is difficult to identify a threshold value above which threat is high and 
below which the threat is low. In order to accurately to address this issue, we 
use Fuzzy logic and Fuzzy sets to calculate the threat estimate. 
(i)  Fuzzy Logic: 
Fuzzy logic is determined as a set of mathematical principles for 
knowledge representation based on degrees of membership rather than on crisp 
membership of classical binary logic. Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of logical 
values between 0 (completely false) and 1 (completely true). Classical binary 
logic can be considered as a special case of multi-valued fuzzy logic. Classic 
(or crisp) set theory is governed by a logic that uses one of only two values: 
true or false. This logic cannot represent vague concepts, and therefore fails to 
give the answers on paradoxes and areas where estimation over a wide set of 
values is needed. The basic idea of fuzzy set theory is that an element belongs 
to a fuzzy set within a certain degree of membership. 
Let X(distance),Y(Movement) and Z(threat) be linguistic variables; A1,A2 
and A3 (far, nearby, close) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets on 
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universe of discourse X (Attacker’s distance from the sensor); B1,B2 and B3 
(farther, stable, closer) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets on 
universe of discourse Y (Attacker’s movement); C1,C2 and C3 (low, moderate, 
high) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets on universe of discourse Z 
(Threat on the node);  
We define the rules that govern the fuzzy logic.  
Rule: 1   Rule: 1  
IF X is A1  IF Distance is far  
OR Y is B1  OR Movement is closer 
THEN Z is C1  THEN Threat is low 
 
Rule: 2 
   
Rule: 2 
 
IF X is A2  IF Distance is nearby 
AND Y is B2  AND Movement is stable 
THEN Z is C2  THEN Threat is moderate 
 
Rule 3: 
   
Rule: 3 
 
IF  X is A3  IF Distance is close 
OR Y is B3  OR Movement is closer 
THEN Z is C3  THEN Threat is high 
     
 Note that the given rules are not comprehensive. Rules for X (A1, A2, A3) 
and Y (B1, B2, B3) can be given in all possible combinations of linguistic 
values which we can derive more sets. For example, a valid rule can be when X 
is A1 and Y is B2 (the distance is far but the attacker is moving closer) then C 
can be set to C1, C2 or C3 (low, medium, high) depending on the requirement 
of the user. The rules given here are for illustration. 
 We use Mamdani-style fuzzy inference to estimate the threat. 
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 Step 1: Fuzzification 
The first step is to get the crisp inputs required. Let r be the actual 
distance of the attacker and s is the movement and determine the degree to 
which these inputs to each of the appropriate fuzzy set. 
In fuzzy theory, the fuzzy set A of universe X is defined by function 
 called membership function of set A. 
 
For any element x of universe X, membership function  equals the degree 
to which x is an element of set A. This degree, a value between 0 and 1, 
represents the degree of membership, also called the membership value, of 
element x in set A. 
  Thus, by combining the each fuzzy set for X, Y and Z we get, 
 
Thus from the crisp (actual) values r and s we can plot the membership value or 
the fuzzified inputs which represent the degree to which each input belong to 
the fuzzy set, within the corresponding universe of discourse. Figure 3.3a and b 
depicts the process of fuzzifying the crisp inputs to get the membership values. 
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Fuzzification of input: distance r 
 
      Distance  
  Fuzzification of input: Movement‘s’ 
 
      Movement  
 
 
Let r1, r2, r3 and s1, s2, s3 be the corresponding membership values resulting 
from fuzzification of crisp inputs r and s, in the fuzzy sets X and Y respectively. 
 
Step: 2 Rule Evaluation 
Degree 
of 
member
ship 
Degree 
of 
member
ship 
Figure 3.3a and b Fuzzification of Inputs 
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 The second step is to take the fuzzified inputs, 
and apply them to the 
antecedents of the fuzzy rules. If a given fuzzy rule has multiple antecedents, 
the fuzzy operator (AND or OR) is used to obtain a single number that 
represents the result of antecedent evaluation [14]. 
OR Operation:  
AND Operation:  
Let t1, t2, t3 be the result of fuzzy logic operators for the fuzzy set Z.  Thus we 
get, 
Rule: 1 
IF             X is A1 (r1) 
OR           Y is B1 (s1) 
THEN      Z is C1 (t1) 
 
 
Rule: 2 
IF             X is A2 (r2) 
AND        Y is B2 (s2) 
THEN      Z is C2 (t2) 
 
 
 
Rule 3: 
IF             X is A3 (r3) 
OR           Y is B3 (s3) 
THEN      Z is C3 (t3) 
 
 
 Step 3: Aggregation of the Rule outputs 
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 Aggregation is the process of unification of the outputs of all the rules. In 
other words, we take the membership functions of all rule consequents 
previously obtained and combine them into a single fuzzy set. The resultant 
area represents the all the membership values for the threat estimate.  
  
   Figure 3.4: Aggregation of Rules Outputs 
 Figure 3.4 depicts the aggregation process. In the figure t1, t2 and t3 
indicate the aggregate membership value for each of the rules. ki, kj to kn are 
the range of values in the universe of discourse Z corresponding to the 
membership values t1, t2 and t3. 
 
Step 4: Defuzzification 
 The final step is to obtain the numerical estimate of the threat. The 
fuzziness helps us to evaluate the rules, but the final output of a fuzzy system 
has to be a crisp number. We use the centroid technique to find the final 
estimate. We find the value, referred as center of gravity (COG), indicates the 
…kn ki kj 
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point where a vertical line would slice the aggregate set into two equal masses. 
It can be expressed as  
 
In theory, the COG is calculated over a continuum of points in the 
aggregate output membership function, but in practice, a reasonable estimate can 
be obtained by calculating it over a sample of points. 
 Thus we get, 
 
From the calculating shown above we get the final risk estimation. 
 Thus  will give significantly accurate risk estimation for the 
network. 
3.2.3. Game Theory 
Our non-cooperative game is defined as: , where i is the set of sensor nodes. 
S = {Si}, where Si is the set of strategies for node i  I and U = { Ui } and Ui is the payoff 
function for node i. We need to identify the set of parameters that can be used to define 
an optimal payoff function that fulfills our objectives for securing a sensor network. The 
parameters represent the node’s lifetime, reliability and trustworthiness. These are 
important in calculating the payoff as higher values of these parameters imply higher 
payoff for the network. 
3.2.3.1 Parameters: 
20 
 
This function consists of three parameters:  
(i) Average cost incurred,  
(ii) Integrity of the node,  
(iii)Integrity of the path. 
(i) Average cost incurred [ ]: 
This parameter is a good indicator of a node’s lifetime is cost. The cost involved in at 
the node level is measured in terms of power used. Power is spent when the node 
performs its functions such as packet generation, forwarding and reception. Power is 
also spent during computation of the various data. Typical power consumption of nodes 
can be obtained by statistically observing the nodes power levels for a standard interval. 
Suppose wtot be the total power available for a given node at time t. Let wg, wf, wr be the 
average power loss incurred during packet generation, forwarding, and reception 
respectively, such that wg, wf, wr  > 0. If Pij be the packets involved between nodes i and 
j, then Eg, Ef, Er be the total number of packets that are generated, forwarded and 
received between the nodes i and j
 
respectively. The total power loss between the nodes 
i and j at time t is Et and it can be expressed as the sum of products of the total number 
of packets that were generated, forwarded and received between nodes i and j and its 
related power loss. Then the average cost incurred between nodes i and j at time t is the 
ratio of total loss in power between i and j at t to the total power available at time t. The 
parameter is summarized in the table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: 
Parameter Denoted by Expression 
Total power available wtot -- 
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Average power loss during packet generation wg -- 
Average power loss during packet forwarding wf -- 
Average power loss during packet reception w
r
 
-- 
Total Packets generated between  i and j Eg •ij Pijg (t) 
Total Packets forwarded between i and j Ef •ij Pijf (t) 
Total Packets received between i and j E
r
 
•ij Pij
r (t) 
Total power loss between i and j Et wgEg+wfEf+wrEr 
Average cost incurred 
 
Et / wt 
 
Thus the parameter average cost incurred can be expressed as follows 
 
 
( i i )  Integrity of the node [ ]: 
The integrity of the node indicates how well the node cooperates with the 
other nodes present in the cluster. When the number of packets handled by a 
given node is relatively consistent with the number of packets handled by its 
cluster, we can safely assume that the node cooperates with the network. 
Similarly, drastic difference in this number indicates deviant behavior of the 
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node. The integrity of the given node can be expressed as the ratio of the 
number of packets forwarded to the total number of received and generated 
packets between two nodes at time t.  
Thus  is the measure of throughput experienced between every node.  
 
  Where, η  –  misbehavior pattern ( 0 < η  < 1 )   
η  accounts for misbehavior potential due to such factors as past record of 
mobile code handling and potential tampering of sensor hardware. The integrity 
value decreases when misbehavior (security violation) is detected.  
(iii) Integrity of the path [ ]: 
The payoff function should also represent the trustworthiness of the traffic 
through a given section of the network. We define the integrity of the 
path, , for each cluster as the percentage of exposed traffic(ratio of 
messages that are exposed to the attacker), if security is compromised. Let MJ 
be the message involved in the cluster J. We have  denote the total 
number of messages generated between nodes i and j that belong to cluster J 
in time t and  denote the total number of messages dropped 
between the node i and j during time t in cluster J. The difference between 
total number of messages generated between two nodes and total number of 
messages dropped between them is the number of messages that have been 
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exposed in cluster J but not transferred to the destination, due to 
untrustworthiness of destination and indicates low support and cooperation 
between the source and destination. Let EJ  be the number of exposed packets 
in cluster J which can be obtained from the difference between total generated 
and dropped packets in J in time t. The integrity of the path can be expressed 
as the ratio of total number of exposed packets in J to the total number of 
packets generated in J. The parameters are summarized in the table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: 
Parameter Denoted by Expression 
Total messages generated between 
nodes i and j in cluster J in time t  
-- 
Total messages dropped between 
nodes i and j in cluster J in time t  
-- 
Number of exposed messages in J 
at t 
EJ 
 
Integrity of the path 
 
 
 
 Thus Integrity of the path can be expressed as  
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  represents the proportion of messages that were generated but did not reach 
their destination successfully. 
3.2.3.2 Payoff Function: 
 For simplicity, we define the payoff utility function, , as a linear 
combination. The payoff function is defined as a function of the utility parameters and 
can be expressed as sum of weighted parameters. 
 
     are weight parameters and . Depending upon the sensor 
application their value can be varied. The payoff of the cluster head will be the 
aggregated payoff [4] of nodes in the cluster and the payoff for the network will be the 
aggregated payoff of the clusters 
3.2.4 Game Formulation: 
 We define a model using game theoretic framework for security in sensor 
networks. We define a non-cooperative game between an attacker and the network and 
analyze the strategies. We study the game for Nash equilibrium, leading to the defense 
strategy for the network. We model our game for the network whose objective is to 
minimize risk. That is, the network chooses the strategy that maximizes its payoff by 
minimizing the risk. The net gain for the network for any strategy is calculated based on 
the payoff value at the given time t, the cost spent on defending a node and the overall 
risk. In this section we assume that we have N sensor nodes that are clustered. Each 
cluster has a cluster head we consider them to be the players of the game. As shown in 
earlier sections, the utility parameters help to identify if a given node co-operates with the 
network or not. The parameter node integrity   is higher for a node that does not act 
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selfishly. Each node by supporting the network (forwarding incoming packets) can 
improve its integrity. On the other hand if the node acts maliciously by not forwarding 
the incoming packets and performing inconsistently it will have less node integrity value 
and can be punished.  
3.2.4.1 Non-zero-sum game approach: 
 Consider a two player game involving players and , where has n number 
of strategies numbered {1, 2…n} and has m number of strategies numbered {1, 
2…m}. We consider their various payoff values to be given in matrices A and B 
respectively. 
 Let  be an element of matrix A that represents the payoff of  when player 
chooses the strategy i and player chooses the strategy j, and  be an element of 
matrix B that represents the payoff of  when player chooses the strategy i and player 
chooses the strategy j, where i = {1,2,..n} and j = {1,2,…m}. A pair of strategies 
(i*,j*) is said to constitute a non-cooperative a pure strategy equilibrium, otherwise 
known as Nash equilibrium, solution to the game if the following pair of inequalities is 
satisfied:  and   From [15] we can 
understand that a two player, non-zero-sum game may or may not have a pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium. 
3.2.4.1(a) Strategies 
 Consider a node k in a cluster within the sensor network. With respect to that 
particular node k, an attacker has 3 strategies. 
1. IS1: the attacker can choose to attack the node k 
2. IS2: the attacker can choose not to attack at all 
3. IS3: the attacker can choose to attack a node other than node k 
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As for the network, it has 3 strategies 
1. SS1: the network can choose to defend the node k 
2. SS2: the network can choose to defend a different node other than k. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Strategy Scenario 
 
 
The strategy scenarios are as depicted in Fig 3.5. The dotted lines indicate the 
strategies of the network and the solid lines indicate the strategies of the attacker. 
The attacker chooses a strategy to attack a node. The network tries to identify the 
response that will maximize its payoff. 
We construct the payoff matrices A and B which express the payoff of players in 
the form of 2 X 3 matrices.  Let U(t) be the payoff of the network at time t. Let  
be the cost of losing a malicious node k and be the cost of the defending a node 
k. This cost depends on the importance of the node to the network and the node’s 
interactivity with other nodes within the cluster. Let NK be the number of nodes in 
the cluster, where node k is the cluster head. Let RK be the amount of risk 
minimized by the network by defending the node k. We also have P(t) which is 
Wireless 
Sensor 
Attacker 
IS2 
IS3 
Node 
k’ 
Node k 
IS1 
SS1 
SS2 
SS2 
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the profit gained by the attacker after a successful attack but every successful 
intrusion by the attacker will incur a cost denoted by Costint for the attacker. Table 
3.3 lists the parameters used. 
Parameter Description Associated with 
U(t) Payoff of the network at time t Network 
 
Cost of losing a malicious node k Network 
 
Cost of defending a node k Network 
NK 
Number of nodes in the cluster, where 
node k is the cluster head. 
Network 
RK Minimized risk by defending a node k Network 
P(t) Profit of each successful intrusion by 
the attacker 
Attacker 
Costint Cost of any successful intrusion Attacker 
 
Table 3.3 Payoff related parameters 
 For the attacker the profit is gained by successfully making an intrusion into the 
network and that incurs a cost. So the net profit is the difference between the two 
values [P(t)- Costint]. For the network, it has a payoff value at time t calculated using 
the utility parameters. But for every strategy it uses to defend the node it incurs a cost 
and hence that must be subtracted from the payoff. Moreover, the node looks at 
minimizing the risk and therefore every strategy that successfully defends the node k 
will reduce the overall risk associated with that node and therefore it is a gain for the 
overall payoff of the network. 
We define the network’s payoff matrix as follows: 
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Here, represents the payoff if the players follow the strategy tuple (AS1, SS1), 
which is when the attacker and the network choose the same node (k) to attack and to 
defend, respectively. Thus, for the network, its original utility value of U(t) will be 
deducted by the cost of defense. The term represents the payoff corresponding to the 
strategy tuple (AS2, SS1), which is when the attacker does not attack at all but the 
network defends node k, so we have to deduct the cost of defense.  represents the 
payoff for the strategy tuple (AS3, SS1), which is when the attacker attacks node k0 but 
the network defends node k  k’. In this case, we subtract the average cost of defending 
one node from original utility, as well as deducting the loss of losing another node. The 
term  represents the payoff of the strategy tuple (AS1, SS2), which is when the 
attacker and the network choose two different nodes to attack and to defend.  
represents the payoff of the strategy tuple (AS2, SS2), which is when attacker does not 
attack at all but the network defends node k’  k.  represents the payoff of the 
strategy tuple (AS3, SS2), which is when attacker attacks a node other than k and k’ and 
the network defends another node. In this case, we subtract the average cost of defending 
one node from original utility, as well as deducting the average loss of losing another 
node. 
We define the attacker’s payoff matrix as follows: 
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Here, and  represent attacks to node k, while  and  represent attacks to 
nodes other than node k. We subtract the cost of attack from the profit of conquering a 
node. Also,  and represent non-attack mode. As the attacker in these two modes 
decides to attack in the future, it would not gain anything. On the other hand, as we 
would like to encourage the attacker to attack,  and  are set to be zero. 
• Cost of defending a node  
         For the network, the cost of defense is the price it must pay to protect a 
node that is most likely to be under attack. We claim that it is dependent on two 
parameters:  
(i) the cost of protecting a node, which is more important in the network-like 
aggregation point, must be higher than the cost of protecting a normal node; 
and  
(ii) the cost must be dependent on the number of nodes communicating with that 
node. 
We define the cost of defending a node as 
 
where is the weight of the node i. The more important a node is to cluster/network 
the higher is the weight of the node. is the number of nodes communicating with 
the node i which can be derived from the node density  as shown in [16]. 
• Profit of Attacker [P(t)]/ Loss of losing a node for a network [ ]: 
The profit of a successful attack for an attacker and the loss of a malicious node by 
the network are functions of the node density  and reliability  of node i at time 
t. By attacking an important node, the attacker gains more, while losing an important 
node incurs more loss to the network. The density of the node can range from a few 
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sensors to a few hundreds. In general the density can be as high as 20 sensor nodes 
/ . 
In a zero sum game the value that a player gains must be equal to the loss incurred 
by some other player. The game we have modeled here is a non-zero-sum game 
because the network always tries to protect itself but if the attacker does not attack, 
the payoff one player decreases since the network incurs the defending cost) while the 
other player’s payoff is steady (attacker does not loose or gain payoff).  
3.2.4.1(b) Nash Equilibrium: 
To study the equilibrium solution for this game, we have to look at the dominant 
strategies in game theory. Given a bimatrix game defined by two  matrices A 
and B, which are payoffs of player and respectively, we say that “row i” 
dominates “row k” if  In other words, “row i” is called a 
dominant strategy for player . Therefore for , selecting “row i” will give it a 
payoff at least equal to selecting “row k” which is the weak strategy. Since player 
is a rational player and will look for maximizing benefits, will always choose 
“row i” and therefore we can remove “row k” from the game because it will never be 
considered. 
From the given payoff matrices we analyze to check for equilibrium. First, in the 
network’s payoff matrix  and in the attacker’s payoff matrix , we 
can clearly indentify that SS1 is the dominant strategy. Since SS1 defends the node 
that is being attacked it will always yield higher payoff than the strategy SS2 
(defending another node). This reduces A and B to two  matrices. We can also 
observe that . In we have the payoff for the strategy when node 
31 
 
k is attacked and defended. In we have the payoff for the strategy when node k is 
not attacked by the attacker but it is defended by the network. In we have the 
payoff which is obtained when the attacker attacks some other node than k but the 
network defends k. Hence along with the cost of defending node k the network also 
incurs the cost of losing a malicious node. Among , to identify the 
equilibrium we need to look at four possible cases. Here Nk,  and Ck indicate the 
number of nodes communicating with node k, weight of the node k and cost of 
defending the node k respectively while Nk’, and Ck’ indicate the number of nodes 
communicating with node k’, weight of the node k’ and cost of defending the node k’ 
respectively. 
 
 
In the matrix B, clearly  since  and , which 
implies that the equilibrium for the game is at . So we have 
mathematically and intuitively shown that the strategy pair (IS1, SS1) provides the 
maximum payoff for the players. The equilibrium of the network is when it chooses 
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to defend the node with highest value of  since this node guarantees 
higher minimization risk. The intuition is that the best strategy for the network is 
finding the best node to defend, which is the one with the maximum value of 
 Thus strategy pair  constitutes the Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER IV 
IMPLEMENTATION 
4. Implementation: 
 In this chapter, a case study of the risk assessment model is studied and the game 
is simulated for the equilibrium is given. The risk assessment model is studied using test 
values and the overall risk is estimated for those values. For simulating the game we use 
C language and results of the simulation are shown. 
4.1 Risk Assessment Model: Test Study 
 Here we analyze a test study of the risk assessment model described earlier. We 
go through the steps with test inputs and obtain the final risk estimate. 
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(i) Calculating Damage D: 
To calculate damage we need to identify the vulnerabilities and construct an 
attack tree for a possible attack scenario. For wireless sensor networks, the IEEE 
802.11 wireless communication protocol is widely used. The protocol uses RC4 
cipher whose inherent drawbacks can result in number of active and passive 
attacks using eavesdropping and tampering of wireless transmission etc.[13]. 
Let’s consider eavesdropping for our study. Eavesdropping are a passive attack 
and it does not cause damage to the network by itself. Therefore, we can have a 
damage value of 0 for that node in the attack tree. Note that if the objective of the 
network requires that eavesdropping or other passive attacks be considered as 
serious vulnerabilities themselves then a damage value can be associated with 
those nodes as well. For our test case, we consider it to be of damage value 5. By 
eavesdropping an attacker can gain access to the packets and obtain important 
information, say node ids. Obtaining a node id can help an attacker to make an 
intrusion into the network through id-specific attacks like Sybil, node replication 
attacks. 
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For our test case, we consider eavesdropping to be of damage value 5. By 
eavesdropping an attacker can gain access to the packets and obtain important 
information, say node ids. Obtaining a node id can help an attacker to make an 
intrusion into the network through id-specific attacks like Sybil, node replication 
attacks. But these attacks require more access privileges to the network packets 
which in turn require the information about the encryption system used by the 
network like the keys or port authentication information. Therefore, obtaining a 
node id is not more damaging compared to obtaining authentication data, and 
hence the node in the attack tree that represents the attacker obtaining node id gets 
a smaller damage value compared to the damage value for the node that 
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represents the attacker obtaining authentication information. We assign a damage 
value 20 for the former and 50 for the latter. If the attacker successfully reaches 
these two stages then by combining the information the intruder can cause wide 
variety of damages like masquerading or denial of service attacks. Using node id 
and encryption data, an attacker send seemingly legitimate requests to other nodes 
and obtain more information. In denial of service attacks, let us take flooding or 
jamming a particular node or a part of the network. This is definitely serious 
threat and causes more damage than any preceding stage. Hence we give it a 
higher damage value, say 100. This completes our attack tree with damage values 
that are assigned based on the known vulnerabilities. Note that the topmost node 
in our tree can lead to more possible nodes, representing possible attacks. Note 
that, the tree is not binary and hence, a particular node can result any number of 
nodes, as long as it addresses an exploitable vulnerability. For simplicity we 
restrict our study to this attack tree. Figure 4.1 shows the attack tree for the test 
case. As described in section 3, the damage values get progressively higher as we 
move up the level of node in the tree. 
Next we construct the damage matrix MD. For this attack tree there are 3 levels 
and the most nodes in a level is 2 so we have a 3X2 matrix as shown below. 
 
(ii) Calculating Threat T: 
For calculating threat we use fuzzy logic. We employ the rules described in 
section 3 and we follow the Mamdani method in obtaining the threat value using 
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fuzzy sets. The inputs are distance and movement of the attacker from a given 
node.  
Rule: 1   Rule: 1  
IF X is A1  IF Distance is far  
OR Y is B1  OR Movement is farther 
THEN Z is C1  THEN Threat is low 
 
Rule: 2 
   
Rule: 2 
 
IF X is A2  IF Distance is nearby 
AND Y is B2  AND Movement is stable 
THEN Z is C2  THEN Threat is moderate 
 
Rule 3: 
   
Rule: 3 
 
IF  X is A3  IF Distance is close 
OR Y is B3  OR Movement is closer 
THEN Z is C3  THEN Threat is high 
 
 We apply the same rules from section 3 as shown above. 
 Here X(distance),Y(Movement) and Z(threat) be linguistic variables; 
A1,A2 and A3 (far, nearby, close) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy 
sets on universe of discourse X (Attacker’s distance from the sensor); B1,B2 
and B3 (Farther, stable, closer) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets 
on universe of discourse Y (Attacker’s signal strength); C1,C2 and C3 (low, 
moderate, high) are linguistic values determined by fuzzy sets on universe of 
discourse Z (Threat on the node);  
 Step 1: Fuzzification of Inputs. 
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Let’s take the crisp inputs for distance r to be 19m and movement s to be   
-13m. We can find the corresponding membership values by projecting the crisp 
inputs in the fuzzy sets for X and Y. Figure 4.2a and 4.2b show this process. 
Fuzzification of input: distance r 
 
      Distance  
  Distance X = [ ] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fuzzification of input: Movement ‘s’ 
Degree 
of 
member
ship 
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      Movement  
 
 
Signal Strength Y = [ ] 
The crisp input r =19m (distance) corresponds to the membership functions A2 
and A3 (close and nearby) to the degrees of 0.1 and 0.45 respectively, and the 
crisp input s = -13m (movement) corresponds to the membership functions B1 
and B2 (low and medium) to the degrees of 0.37 and 0.2 respectively. 
Step 2: Rule Evaluation 
 Here we apply the fuzzified inputs to the antecedents of the fuzzy rules. 
Applying the fuzzy rules and their corresponding operators we have, 
 
Rule: 1 
IF             X is A1 (0) 
OR           Y is B1 (0.4) 
THEN      Z is C1 (0.4) 
 
 
Rule: 2 
IF             X is A2 (0.1) 
Degree 
of 
member
ship 
Figure4.2 a and b : Fuzzification 
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AND        Y is B2 (0.2) 
THEN      Z is C2 (0.1) 
 
 
Rule 3: 
IF             X is A3 (0.4) 
OR           Y is B3 (0) 
THEN      Z is C3 (0.4) 
 
 
Thus we get t1=0.4, t2=0.1, t3=0.4 be the result of fuzzy logic operators for the 
fuzzy set Z.  
Step 3: Aggregation of Rule outputs 
 Here we take up the membership functions of all rule consequents 
previously obtained and combine them into a single fuzzy set. The inputs of the 
aggregation process are the list of clipped or scaled consequent membership 
functions and the output is one fuzzy set for each output variable.  
Figure 4.3 shows the way in which the rule aggregation is done to get a single 
fuzzy set for the overall fuzzy output. 
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  Figure 4.3 Aggregations of Rule Outputs 
 Step 4: Defuzzification 
The final step is to obtain the numerical estimate of the threat. We use the 
centroid technique to find the crisp value for threat. 
 
 Substituting the values, we get 
          
Thus the threat value is in the given universe of discourse (0 to 60) is 30. 
(iii)
 
Final Step: Calculating Risk Estimate
 
Now that we have obtained the threat and damage value matrix, we can 
calculate the risk estimate for the network. 
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Consider the network has found intrusion and that the node ids have been 
compromised. Then the from the damage matrix, the value corresponding to 
is 20 and hence  is 20. 
  
 Then we can finalize the risk estimation as 
 
Thus the final Risk Assessment value is 600 which is about 10%. It can be higher or 
lower depending on the tolerance level of the network.  From the threat model we 
can observe that even though the attacker is moving away, the distance of the 
attacker is between close and nearby. Therefore the final threat estimate is 50%. We 
can also observe that the damage value taken from the matrix at time t was only 20% 
of the total damage (from root). Therefore the product of these two values would 
give us a fairly accurate assessment of the risk over the network. 
  The maximum and the minimum could be set boundary values depending on the 
requirement of the user. Here in our text case, the lowest threat value possible was 0 and 
maximum was 60 (distance is close and attacker is very close) and from our attack tree 
we can see that the minimum damage value is 5 (leaf node) and maximum is 100 (root 
node). Thus the overall risk estimation can range from 0 to 6000. 
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4.2 Nash Equilibrium: 
 For checking the equilibrium of the game the sensor network is simulated using 
C. A matrix of   nodes is simulated with test values. Test values were used for 
traffic information and node ids and the simulation was run for 60 time units. The number 
of packets forwarded, received and generated was supplied and the values were varied 
between 0 and 50 randomly in increasing order for each time unit. 
The total power was set to 100 for each node and the average power loss for 
every packet generated, received and forwarded was set to 5, 5 and 3. The weight 
parameters are set to  and misbehavior pattern  is 
initially set to 0.5 and the value is increased if the integrity of the node increased and the 
value is reduced if the integrity reduces.   
The total power was set to 100 for each node and the average power loss for 
every packet generated, received and forwarded was set to 5, 5 and 3. The weight 
parameters are set to  and misbehavior pattern  is 
initially set to 0.5 and the value is increased if the integrity of the node increased and the 
value is reduced if the integrity reduces.  The utility payoff is calculated for time t using 
the definition of  U(t) given in 3.2.3.2. 
  For calculating the risk assessment the threat and damage values are supplied using test 
values as shown in the previous section. For simulation purposes the estimated risk for 
the nodes was set between 20 and 70 percent. For calculating the network’s payoff matrix 
the cost of defending the node  was set based on the weight of the node (cluster 
heads are more important than end nodes) which was given number between 1 to 5 and 
the  is the number of nodes communicating with the node under consideration. 
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Similarly the profit of successful attack P(t) for the attacker and the loss of the network 
when a malicious node  are set based on the importance of the node. The objective of 
the security model is to maximize its payoff while minimizing its risk. 
 
                
  
 
 
The payoff in the vertical axis is the payoff gained by the network by implementing the 
chosen response that maximizes the payoff and the horizontal axis is the corresponding 
iterations for which the payoff is shown (total iterations is 60). Thus the strategy chosen 
by the network is the one that gives highest payoff while achieving maximum 
minimization of risk. As shown in section 3.2.4.1b, the best strategy for the network is to 
select the strategy that gives the highest value of . 
Given the test values mentioned above, the game was simulated and the net 
payoff was calculated. Figure 4.4 depicts the graph with network’s payoff against time t. 
Payoff was values were converted into percentile values by scaling [4] and plotted 
p
a
y
o
f
f 
                Time t  Figure 4.4 Game Analyses for Nash Equilibrium 
Iterations → 
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against time. It can be seen that the equilibrium is reached around payoff value 0.5 for the 
strategy. Since the utility parameters were changed randomly for every time t the initial 
payoff values are a bit wayward but as the reputation values got improved the payoff 
stabilized with time. The graph shows that the payoff becomes consistent and hence the 
game has equilibrium under the given strategy. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
5.1 Conclusion: 
 In this work, a risk assessment model integrated with a game theoretic framework 
is investigated for efficiently securing a wireless sensor network. A new methodology to 
effectively estimate risk based on the threat and damage values, using fuzzy logic has 
been introduced. The cost of defending a node and the related gain in payoff with respect 
to the objective of the network was considered while analyzing the game. The main focus 
of this thesis was to secure the sensor network using game theory and accurate estimation 
of the risk such that the objective of the network can be achieved with maximum payoff. 
The risk model studied and test case was analyzed. The game was simulated with test 
values and the strategy set and payoff definition was checked for equilibrium. The game 
model reduces the computational overhead with nodes by moving the decision making to 
cluster heads. By choosing appropriate utility parameters and payoff function the network 
can secure itself efficiently. Future work in this area may focus on identifying more 
sophisticated parameters for calculating the threat in the risk assessment. The model can 
also be analyzed for dynamically changing clusters based networks. 
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APPENDIX 
A)   Fuzzy Logic and Sets and Rules 
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 Fuzzy logic is derived from fuzzy set theory dealing with reasoning that is 
approximate rather than precisely deduced from classical predicate logic. Fuzzy logic is 
determined as a set of mathematical principles for knowledge representation based on 
degrees of membership rather than on crisp membership of classical binary logic. 
 Fuzziness rests on fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic is just a small part of that 
theory. Unlike two-valued Boolean logic, fuzzy logic is multi-valued. It deals with 
degrees of membership and degrees of truth. Fuzzy logic uses a continuum of logical 
values between 0 (completely false) and 1 (completely true). Classical binary logic can be 
considered as a special case of multi-valued fuzzy logic. 
Fuzzy Sets: 
 Fuzzy sets are different from classical set theory by the principle of dichotomy. 
Classic (or crisp) set theory is governed by a logic that uses one of only two values: true 
or false. This logic cannot represent vague concepts, and therefore fails to give the 
answers on paradoxes and areas where estimation over a wide set of values is needed. 
The basic idea of fuzzy set theory is that an element belongs to a fuzzy set within a 
certain degree of membership. Thus a proposition is not either true of false but may be 
partly true or partly false to any degree. 
A fuzzy set can be simply defined as a set with fuzzy boundaries. 
Let X be the universe of discourse (the range of all possible values applicable to a chosen 
variable) and its elements be denoted as x. In classical set theory, crisp set A of X is 
defined as function  called characteristic function of A.  
 
where  
In fuzzy theory, fuzzy set A of universe X is defined by function  
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For any element x of universe X, membership function  equals the degree to which 
x is an element of set A. This degree, a value between 0 and 1, represents the degree of 
membership, also called the membership value, of element x in set A. 
Operations of Fuzzy Set: 
 Operations that can be performed upon a crisp set or a set of crisp sets can also be 
applied on a fuzzy set, but in a different manner such that the result of fuzzy operation 
represents a combined membership degree. For example, complement of A, denoted by 
 can be calculated by . Other operations such as union, 
intersection, containment etc can also be performed using fuzzy operators [14]. 
Common crisp set theory laws such as commutativity, associativity, idempotency etc are 
applicable to fuzzy sets. Fuzzy sets also follow distributive laws [14]. 
Fuzzy Rules: 
 In 1973, a paper by Lotfi Zadeh (Zadeh, 1973) outlined a new approach to 
analysis of complex systems in which he suggested capturing human knowledge in fuzzy 
rules. 
A fuzzy rule can be defined as a conditional statement in the form: 
If x is A 
THEN y is B 
where x and y are linguistic variables; A and B are linguistic values determined by fuzzy 
sets on the universe of discourses X and Y, respectively. 
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